On the occasion of Judge and Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum's 70th birthday, it gives us great pleasure to contribute to this Festschrift in his honour with a chapter on provisional measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Judge Wolfrum, a Member of that Tribunal since 1996 and its President from 2005 to 2008, has greatly contributed to the evolution of the practice of the Tribunal and the development of its jurisprudence. Moreover, from both his judicial offi ce in Hamburg and his academic offi ce as Director of the MaxPlanck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, he has made a great contribution to the international law of the sea and to international law more generally. Th e topic of our piece is thus perhaps a fi tting tribute.
A. General Comments on Provisional Measures
Th e essence of provisional measures is to protect the rights at issue of either party in a case pendente litis, and to prevent the extension or aggravation of a dispute. Such measures were designed to remedy the problem which can arise from the complex, sometimes time-consuming nature of international judicial proceedings, and avoid an eventual judgment becoming meaningless in whole or in part once it is rendered.
1 Particularly interesting about a request for provisional measures is that the court or tribunal seised of such a request, in examining the causes prompting the request, does not examine the nature of the dispute or the facts or law underlying it; instead, it aims to study emerging or existing events external to the proceedings, such as the conduct of the parties in general or with respect to the subject-matter of the dispute, and determines whether the non-indication of measures would seriously impair the rights to be determined later on in the eventual judgment. A strong component of judicial discretion therefore permeates the very nature of provisional measures, although, in the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at least, some criteria have been articulated which help to defi ne objectively the exercise of the power to indicate provisional measures.
2
ITLOS is not in a formal relationship with the ICJ, as both bodies stand independent of and separate from each other; yet in substance, there is a relationship between the two which follows from the fact that the substantive competences of both institutions are broadly situated in the fi eld of the peaceful settlement of international disputes through judicial means.
3 Th ere are of course diff erences in competence ratione materiae between the ICJ and the Tribunal. Th e ICJ has wider material jurisdiction over legal inter-state disputes in all areas of international law, whilst the Tribunal's jurisdiction is confi ned to the interpretation or application of UNCLOS or an international instrument related to the purposes of UNCLOS. 4 However, when establishing the UNCLOS regime, negotiating states were certainly infl uenced by the law and practice of the International Court. 5 In the light of both this and the
